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The Nils Alstrup Dahl Memorial Lecture 2013 
 
Pure Grace?   
Paul’s Distinctive Jewish Theology of Gift 
 
John M.G. Barclay  
 
Abstract: 
 
Paul’s theology of grace has been “perfected” (drawn to an end-of-the-line extreme) 
in many different ways during its history of reception, as super-abundant gift, prior 
gift, gift to the unworthy, gift without return, etc., often with the consequence that 
Judaism is figured as a grace-less religion.  If we distinguish and disaggregate the 
many possible meanings of “grace,” we find in Second Temple Judaism not a single 
or simple concept, but a variety of distinct voices, and even debate, concerning the 
construal of divine beneficence.  Paul does not stand apart from Judaism, but in the 
midst of this debate.  The hallmark of his theology is the interpretation of the Christ-
event as an incongruous divine gift (given without regard for worth) – a notion 
developed in and for his mission to the Gentiles.  Judging from experience that the 
Torah is not how God evaluates worth, Paul locates the believers’ symbolic capital 
only in Christ, with socially radical consequences from which we could still take 
inspiration today.  
 
 
I count it an enormous honour to have been invited to deliver this year’s lecture in 
memory of Nils Alstrup Dahl, a scholar I met only once but whose influence has been 
immense, and whose work I have read and reread since my student days.  Dahl had 
the extraordinary ability to put his finger on critical questions which could open up a 
well-worn subject in a novel way.  He also had a truly independent mind.  At a time 
when scholarship was often circumscribed by schools of thought, Dahl was always 
refreshingly original.  He understood Bultmann and Käsemann better than anyone 
outside of Germany, but he was not awed by their reputations, and offered some of 
the most penetrating criticism of their work: his review of Bultmann’s Theology of the 
New Testament is still the best and most rounded critique of the whole Bultmannian 
project.
1
  Two of Dahl’s essays, in particular, have shaped my preparation for this 
lecture. The first, his fine, probing piece on “The Neglected Factor in New Testament 
Theology” asks why New Testament scholars have paid so little attention to what is 
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said in the New Testament about God (as opposed to Christ, the Spirit, salvation, 
etc.).
2
 The second, his seminal essay on “The Doctrine of Justification: Its Social 
Function and Effects,” explores the correlation between Paul’s theology of 
justification and his social practice in the Gentile mission.
3
  In fact, it was Dahl’s 
capacity to combine social-historical with theological questions, and to show their 
interconnection, that made Dahl such an interesting thinker.  Inspired and instructed 
by him, let me offer here some remarks about Paul and grace which attempt to 
approach that familiar subject afresh. 
 
1. Pure Grace? 
Paul’s comments on the grace or mercy of God are notable for their rhetorical force 
and their antithetical formulations.  The grace of God is not just present in the Christ-
event, it is abundant, indeed super-abundant, overwhelming the human deficit of sin 
with the gift of righteousness and life (Rom 5.12-21; cf. 2 Cor 9.6-13).  God does not 
just have mercy, he has mercy on whomever he wills, without regard to birth, 
ancestry, or behaviour, good or bad (Rom 9.6-18).  The choice of the remnant is “by 
grace and not by works, for then grace would not be grace” (Rom 11.5-6).  Here and 
elsewhere Paul draws the motif of grace (that is, divine gift or favour) to an end-of-
the-line extreme, developing its meaning to a maximum, exploiting the concept to its 
fullest possible extent.  The literary critic, Kenneth Burke, labelled this kind of 
manoeuvre “perfection,” drawing out a motif to its nth degree, much like we might 
speak of a terrible concatenation of events as “perfect storm” or a complex and 
extremely inconvenient obstacle as a “perfect nuisance.”4  It is not just the adjective 
“perfect” that signals this tendency.  In the wake of Paul and inspired by Paul, 
Christian theology has coined a whole set of phrases and epithets to perfect the topic 
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of grace.  Grace is spoken of as “pure grace” or “sheer gift”; salvation is sola gratia 
(by grace alone).  The grace of God is free, sovereign, totally gratuitous, 
indiscriminate, unconditional, unconditioned, uncontingent, unmerited, unstinting, 
and a whole set of other “un”-adjectives; definition by negation is characteristic of the 
tendency to perfect an idea.   
 It is common in the Christian theological tradition to multiply these 
perfections, and to purify the notion of grace from as many potential alloys as 
possible.  Usually something is at stake here not only theologically but politically, 
because the perfection of a theological motif constitutes a claim to theological 
correctness, and thus to true inheritance of the Christian tradition: if others do not 
perfect grace the way “we” do, they have not just an inadequate but a false 
understanding of the heart of the gospel.  One may observe this tendency right from 
the beginning of the history of reception of Paul.  Inspired by Paul, and by a 
philosophical conception of the goodness of God, Marcion in the mid-second century 
thought it crucial to recover the authentic Pauline gospel by distinguishing clearly 
between the God of justice, who judges, punishes, and causes the suffering rife in this 
poorly created world, and the God of love and mercy revealed in Jesus Christ, who is 
not only bonus but optimus (supremely good) and whose perfect goodness (perfecta 
bonitas) is clear in the fact that he is good and nothing but good, with a generosity 
that could not possibly judge or condemn.
5
  Two-and-a-half centuries later, Augustine 
read Paul very differently on this point, but with an equal concern to perfect the 
Pauline theme of grace.  Impressed by the depth of human sinfulness, down to the 
deepest inclinations of the heart, Augustine perfected the incongruity of grace, the 
utter mismatch between the favour of God and the fittingness or worth of the human 
recipient.  The more he thought about this, in repeated rereadings of Paul and ever 
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more violent controversy with Pelagius and the Massilians, the more Augustine 
pressed the theme of grace in additional directions.
6
  If we have nothing that we have 
not received (1 Cor 4.7) and if the Spirit is poured into our hearts to grant us the very 
capacity to love God (Rom 5.5), then everything in the Christian life, even faith itself, 
must be attributed to God’s gratia gratuita.7  Augustine’s notoriously strong views of 
predestination and of the certain perseverance of the saints are the end result of this 
line of thinking.
8
 
 Grace is of course integral to every Christian theology, and there is a good 
case for insisting that Pelagius was also a theologian of grace, of the God who gives 
us all we need to perform his commandments well.  Augustine did not believe in 
grace more, he simply perfected it in different and in multiple ways.  This sort of 
clash was operative again, of course, in the Reformation, though in very different 
circumstances.  Luther attempted to break with the whole theology of the circularity 
of grace, in which he had been reared.  For Luther, we not do good in order to win 
God’s grace, which then enables us to do better and merit more, since God has given 
us everything once and for all in Christ, in a grace that we have simply to receive.
9
  
Sola gratia meant for Luther not Marcion’s notion of the God who could do nothing 
but give, but (closer to Augustine) God giving not to the deserving but to the utterly 
unworthy and unfit.  But what emerges in Luther is also the beginning of another 
meaning of “pure grace.”  If God’s grace operates outside the principle of quid pro 
quo, God does not give in order to receive a return, and our giving to others should 
also be unilateral, seeking no recompense or counter-gift but gladly pursuing the 
welfare of the other alone.
10
  Calvin, sharing Luther’s emphasis on the incongruity of 
grace, developed Augustinian theology also on the priority of grace, emphasizing 
God’s providence and predestination in election.  But he also scrutinized the operation 
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of grace in the ongoing life of the believer.  There is for Calvin a “double grace” – the 
grace of sanctification alongside the grace of justification – and one must speak 
clearly of the efficacy of grace in the agency of the believer lest one lapse into 
inadequate theologies of co-operation or “synergism.”11  Here one sees very clearly 
the tendency for “pure grace” or sola gratia to take on more and more connotations. 
 Twentieth-century interpretations show a similar tendency to radicalize or 
perfect Paul’s theology of grace, though in differing ways.  Barth’s emphasis on grace 
as the absolutely free and unconditioned act of God was part of his insistence on the 
“infinite qualitative difference” between humans and God, time and eternity; if God 
acts in grace towards us it is never because of our condition but always despite it.
12
  
The same incongruity is basic to the neo-Lutheran interpretations of Bultmann and 
Käsemann, who set the divine gift over against the human illusion that we can gain 
life from our own resources and accomplishments (Bultmann) or standing on our own 
privileges (Käsemann).  In these readings, what Bultmann called “pure gift” (reines 
Geschenk) stands in opposition to the human desire to achieve or procure for 
ourselves.  In other more recent readings, which put Paul’s language of charis in the 
context of ancient practices of gift, an effort is often made to distinguish Paul from 
ancient systems of reciprocity, by insisting that God’s grace is “unilateral.”13  One 
senses here the influence of the modern Western perfection of gift, famously drawn to 
its extreme by Derrida, according to whom a gift is only a gift if it requires and gets 
no return.
14
 “Pure grace” on this reading means without demand and without 
recompense, a unilateral transaction completely free of the circular motion which was 
everywhere associated with gift in antiquity, as epitomised by the “Three Graces” 
dancing in a ring. 
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 What is evident even from this cursory survey is that grace is a motif with 
many possible dimensions; the tendency to perfect the notion of “pure grace” can take 
many different forms.  It is as if the Pauline rhetoric of antithesis and excess has 
spawned a multiplicity of perfections, extensions, and refinements that may 
themselves be a form of excess.  Have we loaded Paul with more than his texts can 
bear?  Have the pressures of ideological differentiation within the Christian tradition 
encumbered our reading of Paul with expectations not only beyond but even contrary 
to his initial impulse?  To ask that question is not yet to answer it, but it is to alert 
ourselves to the special problems that surround the word “grace” and to approach the 
history of reception of this theme with critical caution.  It would be salutary to go 
back to the beginning and to ask what we mean, and what Paul means, by “grace.” 
 
2.  Grace and Judaism 
Accompanying the history of reception of Paul has been a widespread tendency to 
mark a clear distinction, on the subject of grace, between Paul and his Jewish 
contemporaries.  Although there was dispute among interpreters from early in 
Christian history over whether by “works of the law” Paul meant distinctively Jewish 
customs or good works in general, even those who took the latter view considered 
Judaism to be in some measure the antithesis to Paul’s theology of grace.  Luther took 
Paul to attack operarii – works-people of all kinds – but his list of such people 
generally began with “Jews” and in the German revival of Lutheranism at the start of 
the 20
th
 century, the Pauline antitheses were taken to be directed particularly against 
Paul’s fellow Jews.  Bultmann knew that a Jew would “contradict the proposition that 
justification by works of the law and justification by divine grace appropriated in faith 
exclude each other” but he took this contradiction to be Paul’s “decisive thesis.”15  In 
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fact, for Bultmann Paul’s analysis of sin reached its acme in his attack on Jewish 
works of the law, since the very effort to keep the law expressed the human attempt to 
secure salvation by our own strength.  When Käsemann wanted to explain that Paul’s 
target was the illusory self-confidence in every human being, he saw fit to express this 
as “the hidden Jew in all of us.”16    Thus the multiple perfections of grace in Paul 
have tended to serve as the foil to a denigrating portrayal of Judaism, right up to the 
recent and otherwise stimulating interpretation of Paul by Alain Badiou.
17
  
 E.P. Sanders’ extensive analysis of Paul and Palestinian Judaism attempted to 
end that tradition, and with large effect.
18
  Sanders emphasized that the structure of 
Judaism – including most of the literature contemporary with Paul – was covenantal, 
that is, that one “gets in” by divine grace in covenant election, even if one “stays in” 
by observing the Law.  As Sanders puts it, “the notion that God’s grace is in any way 
contradictory to human endeavour is totally foreign to Palestinian Judaism.  The 
reason for this is that grace and works were not considered alternative roads to 
salvation.  Salvation is always by the grace of God, embodied in the covenant.”19 
Sanders thus concluded that on the subject of grace and works there is really no 
difference between Paul and his fellow Jews, however they might differ on 
Christology or other matters.  Starting from this point, the “New Perspective on Paul” 
identified Paul’s target as national exclusivism or ethnocentricity, developing an old 
Enlightenment trope which contrasted Jewish particularity with Christian 
universalism.
20
  But the “new perspective” found nothing of particular significance in 
Paul’s theology of grace, a topic on which there has been rather little research in the 
last generation of scholarship. 
 Sanders is right that there is grace everywhere in Judaism, including the 
Judaism contemporary with Paul.  But grace is not everywhere the same.  Grace can 
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be perfected or not perfected, and if perfected, perfected in a number of different 
ways.  Philo, for instance, says much divine grace, with equal if not greater emphasis 
than Paul on the super-abundance of divine generosity.  It is crucial for Philo to insist 
that God’s grace is always prior, since God is the cause or origin of all good things.  
But he is wary of the notion that God’s gifts could be given to the unworthy.  In one 
sense, everything and everyone is unworthy in comparison with God.  But God is not 
an indiscriminate or unfair benefactor, and his gifts, such as his covenants, are 
generously but discriminately given to the axioi, the fitting or appropriate recipients.
21
  
There are good reasons for this caution, not least the need to uphold the justice of the 
cosmic order.  Divine gifts must be presumed to undergird, not disrupt, the moral and 
social order of the world; in fact, they are good gifts only if they do so.  The gift to the 
fitting is not pay; it is not earned or contractual, nor the product of a temporary 
relationship like wages or a commercial transaction.  But a gift, like a reward, is not 
given to just anyone, and one might expect a generous God, like a generous human 
benefactor, to be lavish but discriminate in the giving of gifts. 
 This topic is in fact once which divides opinion among Second Temple Jews.  
Sanders’ common structure of “covenantal nomism” is over simplistic; it masks the 
fact that the grace or mercy of God was a matter of debate among Jews and capable of 
many kinds of nuance.  In The Wisdom of Solomon, for instance, the gracious work of 
Wisdom, which anticipates the human recipient, is fully celebrated (e.g. Wis 3.9; 
4.15).  But the catalogue of those whom Wisdom has saved (Wisdom 10) is carefully 
calibrated to bring out the righteous status of each, including the patriarchs and heroes 
up to the Exodus generation, who are saved from the ungodly Egyptians precisely as 
fitting recipients of divine grace.  In extolling this phenomenon, Wisdom 11-12 offers 
a long and fascinating discussion of the relation between divine justice, divine power, 
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and divine mercy, emphasizing God’s love for all creatures and the lengths to which 
God has gone in giving even incorrigible sinners the chance to repent.  But mercy has 
to be correlated with justice, otherwise the cosmic order to which Wisdom is so 
strongly committed, would collapse.  Mercy cannot exclude or overrule judgment, 
even if it modifies, delays, or extenuates its operation.  Few texts in antiquity put such 
consistently heavy stress on the goodness, the love, and the benevolence of God: but 
this is not finally perfected as incongruous grace to the unworthy, lest the fairness and 
symmetry of the cosmos collapse.   
 There are other Jewish texts that do perfect the incongruity of grace, most 
notably the hymns in the Qumran Hodayot (1QH
a
).  Here the author goes to even 
greater extremes than Paul in depicting the depravity of the human being: both 
physically, as a conglomerate of filth and dust, and morally, as a sinner full of error 
and deceit, the “I” of these prayers indulges in unrelenting self-deprecation.  At the 
same time, these hymns extol the mercy and the righteousness of God, his bountiful 
mercy and everlasting hesed which graciously grant knowledge, favour and 
forgiveness to the worthless human.  These hymns perfect the incongruity of grace in 
a way that neither Philo nor the Wisdom of Solomon would have dared to do.  Such 
incongruity is given a deep rationale in the predestination of the elect, such that the 
choice of these creatures of filth is built into the pre-planned order of the universe.   
 That such different views on divine grace could be a matter of debate among 
Jews is illustrated by 4 Ezra, which in its dialogues between Ezra and Uriel, and 
especially in its profound and moving third dialogue, sets out alternate ways of 
configuring divine grace (4 Ezra 6.36 – 9.25).  The angel Uriel, viewing life from the 
perspective of the final judgment and of the perfect world to come, insists that divine 
mercy cannot be exercised on sinners in the end, or the demands of justice would lose 
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all seriousness.  There will indeed be mercy, but mercy on the righteous, and if it 
turns out that there are extremely few of these, that is just the way it is: anyone would 
prefer a tiny scrap of gold to a large mass of useless dust.  Ezra, contemplating the 
fate of the majority of humanity, makes vivid appeal to divine mercy: did not God 
declare himself (in Exodus 34) as the one who is gracious and patient, and will he not 
be rightly called merciful if he has pity on those who do not have any works of 
righteousness (4 Ezra 7.132-40; 8.20-36)?  Ezra would define grace as an incongruous 
gift, mercy on those who have no store of good works.  Uriel will allow that mercy 
might operate thus in this life, but it cannot be the final blueprint of the universe, 
effectual at the judgment.  Uriel still talks of mercy, but only on those who “rule over 
their minds and discipline their hearts” (14.34).  The author of 4 Ezra wrestles as a 
Jew with the definition of mercy or grace, and makes clear that this is not a simple nor 
a univocal concept.  Second Temple Judaism speaks much of the grace of God, but it 
speaks of this subject in varied and sometimes contradictory ways.  There are many 
distinctive Jewish voices on this subject.    
 
3.  Paul, Grace, and the Gentile Mission 
On this fuller and more nuanced reading of Second Temple Judaism, it is possible to 
place Paul among his fellow Jews in his discussion of divine grace, not apart from 
them in some unique or antithetical position.  At the same time he stands in the midst 
of a debate, not as a spokesman for a single, simple, or uncontested notion.  Romans 
9-11 shows that Paul takes part in this Jewish discussion of grace on traditional 
Jewish terrain.  Like other Second Temple Jews he probes the criteria by which God 
has governed the history of his people, and like them he seeks illumination from a 
plethora of scriptural texts and incidents.  It is characteristic of many of such Jewish 
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discussions – one may compare, Philo, Ps.-Philo, or Jubilees – to go back to the 
patriarchal narratives to find there the secret of God’s modus operandi.  On numerous 
occasions the Pentateuch declares that God is patient and merciful to his wayward 
people is only because of his promise to the patriarchs (e.g., Exod 32.13-14; Deut 7.1-
11; 9.4-14) so the question will naturally arise: and why did God choose them?  Was 
there something about their character or their behaviour, their quest or their 
obedience, that made them fitting recipients of the divine favour and the covenant 
promises?  Philo was anxious to find some such rationale, lest God’s choice appear 
arbitrary and unjust.  What is striking about Paul is his refusal to identify any criterion 
of fit in God’s election of the patriarchs.  Abraham had no grounds of worth (or 
possible basis for pride, Rom 4.1-6); Isaac was chosen not on the basis of his birth 
(Rom 9.6-9); Jacob was preferred over Esau not because of anything he had done or 
not done, nor by reference to the primacy of the first-born (Rom 9.10-13).  Time after 
time, Paul strips away possible criteria of worth, in order to highlight what is for him 
the centrally significant feature of the grace or mercy of God: its incongruity with the 
fit or worth of the recipient.  Like Ezra in the third 4 Ezra dialogue, Paul identifies 
this as the core characteristic of the mercy of God; against Uriel he would insist that 
this is definitive, not just a temporary measure for the present world. 
 What makes the incongruity of grace definitive for Paul is his interpretation 
and experience of the Christ-event.  The death of Christ was “for our sins,” indeed “to 
rescue us from the present evil age” (Gal 1.4).  It was while we were still weak that 
Christ for the ungodly – an incongruity that Paul parades as truly extraordinary (Rom 
5.6-8).  With an analysis of the human plight at some points comparable to the 
gloomy anthropology of the Qumran Hymns, Paul finds no point of compatibility or 
fit between the worth of the human and the gift of God.  God’s mercy is not 
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selectively distributed according to any criterion of gender, age, social class, moral 
achievement or ethnic identity (cf. 1 Cor 1.26-29).   This is a problematic, indeed 
dangerous, configuration of grace, but it fitted Paul’s experience both of his own life 
and of his mission among the Gentiles.  Paul was an excellent, tradition-observant 
Jew, faultless in his observance of the Torah, but it was not for that reason that he was 
“called” (Gal 1.13-16).  In fact, his zealous loyalty to his traditions led him to 
persecute the church, but he was not for that reason not called.  Why was he “called in 
grace” (Gal 1.15)?  Neither his positive nor his negative tokens of worth could offer 
an explanation.  The Gentiles to whom he preached the good news were on multiple 
grounds unworthy.  They had the wrong ancestry, the wrong ideas about God, and a 
habit of immoral practices; but God saw fit to call them, and to give them the gift of 
his Spirit (Gal 3.1-5; 4.8-11; 1 Cor 6.9-11).  The gift of God in Christ was neither 
endorsement nor reward for living like a Jew; it was an incongruous gift that bore no 
relation to the fittingness of the recipient.  It is this that Paul declares as the hallmark 
of the Christ-gift, with disruptive and subversive effect.  For if this gift was 
unconditioned, all previous criteria of value are rendered questionable or void; the 
incongruous gift of Christ shatters the taken-for-granted norms of worth.  My gospel, 
says Paul, is not about pleasing people (Gal 1.9), because it is not attuned to normal 
criteria of reason or value: it is not kata anthrōpon, not “according to human norms” 
(Gal 1.10).   
 Here, as so often, Dahl put his finger on precisely the salient point: Paul’s 
theology of justification (and, we may add, grace) is worked out in the context of the 
Gentile mission, and largely for its sake.
22
  It is not an abstract doctrine about God, 
nor is its focus primarily the condition of the individual: it has a social function, and 
multiple social implications.  Paul preached to Gentiles without requiring that they 
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adopt the Jewish symbols of identity, not because he had signed a charter of universal 
equal rights, but because no-one’s status is taken into account by God.  In this 
negative universality, grace pays no regard to ethnic worth.  At the same time, the 
experience of the Gentile mission, and critical moments of conflict in Jerusalem, 
Antioch, and Galatia (Gal 2.1-21) established the conviction that the gift of God 
cannot and should not be framed by the value-system of the Torah.  To borrow the 
language and concepts of Pierre Bourdieu, this is a question of “symbolic capital.”  To 
consider “the works of the law” as the criterion of righteousness (that is, in Jewish 
terms, worth) is to assume the validity of a form of symbolic capital that has been 
shown in the Christ-event to be of no significance to God (Gal 2.16).  To make the 
Gentiles “Judaize” (Gal 2.14) is to invest in that capital, but believers know that that 
counts for nothing before God.  To take the works of the law as the measure of value 
is to bank on an outdated or irrelevant currency, like collecting Deutschmarks when 
the currency has shifted to Euros.  So what is the new currency?  Hardly some other 
human capacity or some hidden, inherent token of worth, but what Paul calls “faith in 
Christ” – that is, the acknowledgement that there is no human currency that God 
counts of value, since the only thing of worth is Christ himself.
23
  Faith for Paul is not 
some alternative human achievement or a refined human spirituality, but a declaration 
of bankruptcy, a radical and shattering recognition that the only capital in God’s 
economy is the gift of Christ, crucified and risen.   
 It is important to be clear about what is, and is not, here implied about the law 
(the Jewish Torah).  Paul is not declaring the Law to be evil or sinful, and his gospel 
is not “Law-free” in the sense that he renders it impossible to be a believer and still 
observe the Law.  The Law does not betoken or promote a sinful attitude of self-
righteousness or self-dependence, and Paul does not deny the value of “works of the 
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law” because they foster the illusion that one can procure salvation from oneself.  
Paul’s focus is not, in fact, on the inner attitude and self-understanding of the 
“worker,” as analyzed so powerfully in the Lutheran tradition.  His point is in some 
ways simpler, though extremely far-reaching.  The Torah (and by “works of the law” 
he means practice of the Torah, not just certain tokens of national identity) is simply 
not the criterion by which God judges value or worth.  Jewish believers may indeed 
continue to observe it, Sabbath, food-laws and all, but only inasmuch as they can do 
so “to the Lord,” that is out of loyalty to Christ (Rom 14.4-6).24  For this reason they 
may not insist on others (Gentile believers) also observing this law, if they can 
genuinely practise their loyalty to Christ in other forms.  In other words, the Torah 
itself is no longer the final arbiter of value, and that not because it is particularistic or 
misleading but because the Christ-gift, given without regard to previous norms of 
worth, has relativized its standards of value.  “In Christ neither circumcision counts 
for anything (ti ischuei: has value or worth), nor uncircumcision, but faith working 
through love” (Gal 5.6).  Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision: Paul is not 
validating an alternative, non-Jewish or anti-Jewish, token of value, like the Greeks 
valued the beautiful male, unblemished body.  If the Christ-gift is wholly 
incongruous, it declares the ultimate insignificance of all previous forms of symbolic 
capital, including Gentile hierarchies of gender, age, education, social and legal status 
(Gal 3.28).  The goal of Paul’s mission is the construction of communities which 
attempt to disregard these old values, and the contests for honour that surround them, 
even if these communities are imperfectly formed and their goals imperfectly 
articulated by Paul himself.  What he wants is not deracination or the obliteration of 
all previous identities, but a radical disinvestment in such identities as bearers of 
symbolic worth.  If what really counts for worth among Pauline believers is what they 
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have been made in Christ, they can use or disregard these other identities as fits the 
purpose of the good news and the interests of the community.  To live, as he puts it 
“under grace” (Rom 6.14-15) is to be subordinate to a new authority, a new standard 
of worth that reshuffles and recalibrates all previous systems of value.   
 Thus what we find in Paul is a highly paradoxical relationship to his Jewish 
heritage.  On the one hand, the theology of grace that he enunciates and practises is 
thoroughly Jewish: it has its roots in (a reading of) Scripture, it is part of the 
contemporary Jewish debate about the grace or mercy of God, and it has at least 
partial parallels with other voices in that debate, such as Ezra in 4 Ezra and the author 
of the Qumran Hymns.  Paul’s construal of divine grace in Christ is not directed 
against Judaism, as if Judaism itself was devoid of grace.  On the other hand, the way 
that Paul radicalizes the notion of the incongruity of grace, his connection of that 
grace to the death and resurrection of Christ, and the distinctive way in which he 
preaches and practises that grace in his Gentile mission all end up in a relativization 
of the Torah which seems without parallel among his Jewish peers.  To say “I have 
died to the law in order to live to God” (Gal 2.19) sounds shocking in the Jewish 
discourse of the first century, yet Paul connects that statement to his insistence that he 
will not reject the grace of God (Gal 2.21).  It is not just Gentiles who have died to the 
Law, but even Paul himself, as a paradigmatic Jewish believer in Christ; as he 
indicates in Phil 3.2-11, the law, together with the rest of his Jewish heritage, no 
longer represents his symbolic capital.  Paul is neither anti-Jewish nor post-Jewish, 
but neither does his configuration of the grace of God in Christ leave his Jewish 
identity unchanged or his Torah-allegiance unchallenged.  Scholars of every 
generation struggle to articulate this paradox.
25
  Perhaps the topic that Sanders 
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persuaded the past generation to disregard, the topic of grace, provides another way to 
open it up. 
 What may we say, then, about Paul as a theologian of “pure grace”?  It all 
depends on what we mean by “grace” and which of its multiple possible dimensions 
and perfections we wish to evoke.  I have argued here that in one sense – and in this 
sense radically and consistently – Paul does articulate a theology of “by grace alone,” 
if we mean by that that the grace of God takes no account of the worth or fit of the 
recipient but is in essence an incongruous gift.  As we have seen, that was not a 
necessary or even particularly common configuration of divine gift in antiquity, 
because it threatened the notion that the world was justly ordered by God.  Paul 
knows about this danger (see Romans 9) but embraces it.  As in the Qumran Hymns, 
his emphasis on the incongruity of grace is partly explained by reference to God’s 
prior decision or choice.  There are certainly elements of predestinarian thinking in 
Pauline theology (Rom 8.28-29; 9.6-26), but these seem intended to support and 
defend the incongruity of grace, and do not have independent significance in support 
of a separable concept of the sovereignty of God.  If by “pure grace” we mean that 
God is singular in benevolence and removed from any notion of judgement, we can 
hardly credit Paul with that perfection: it was notable that Marcion needed to excise 
parts of the Pauline letters to achieve this reading of Paul, and in its modern guise 
(e.g., in the work of Douglas Campbell) a similar procedure is required, attributing 
inconvenient sections of Romans to someone other than Paul.
26
  Similarly, if “pure 
grace” means that God gives, expecting nothing in return, on the grounds that gift is 
(in Derrida’s view of the matter) by definition without recompense or return, we 
would also find this an imposition on Paul, who finds no difficulty in speaking of 
obedience as the state of those who live “under grace” (Rom 6.12-23).  Of course 
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many additional things might and should be said about believers as newly created 
agents rendered capable of obedience, but here again we must beware lest we 
overload Paul’s theology of grace with connotations beyond its range.  It is certainly 
the case that Paul can swing to and fro in descriptions of agency: “by the grace of God 
I am what I am, and his grace towards me has not been in vain.  On the contrary I 
worked harder than all of them – though it was not I but the grace of God that is with 
me” (1 Cor 15.10).27  But Paul does not press this point such as to complicate every 
statement of believer agency (“love your neighbour – or rather, not you, but the Spirit 
who loves in you”), nor does he perfect the notion of the efficacy of grace in the sense 
that grace is the real or primary agent in all that may be said of the actions of the 
believer.  The concern with questions of agency which motivates the work of J.Louis 
Martyn, and lies behind many of arguments for the “subjective genitive” 
interpretation of pistis Christou (as “the faithfulness of Christ”), seems fully 
comprehensible as a reaction against contemporary forms of Christian moralism and 
gospel-less activism.
28
  But it is liable to overload Paul’s discourse and his theology 
of grace with additional dimensions and perfections beyond the horizon or the 
interests of Paul himself.   
 And here is the heart of the matter.  Paul’s simple and radical perfection of 
grace as the incongruous gift of God, given without regard for worth, has been often 
and readily supplemented with other perfections that load “pure grace” with multiple 
additional meanings.  Paul’s historical horizon, his engagement in the culture-
relativizing Gentile mission, was of a piece with his conviction that the Christ-gift 
took no account of human definitions of worth, not even those previously defined by 
the practice of the law.  His context is mission, the right and necessity to cross ethnic 
and cultural boundaries, and the creation of communities that attempt to live in 
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accordance with a new definition of symbolic capital significantly at odds with their 
inherited traditions.  In this context, what matters about grace is its incongruity, its 
disregard of worth; that is what justifies common meals at Antioch (Gal 2.11-14) and 
the conduct of a Gentile mission not beholden to the rules of the Jewish community.  
In subsequent generations, when Paul’s “conversionist” phase was over or no longer 
the salient context for theology, when the dominant horizon was the conduct and 
continuation of the Christian church, when the new hearers of Paul’s letters were 
already baptized as infants and took for granted the Christian evaluation of symbolic 
capital, Paul’s theology of grace was inevitably developed and extended in new 
forms.  Now it became important to understand the interior effects of grace, to discuss 
how the agency of God in grace relates to the agency of believers themselves.  The 
Reformation reading of Paul was an attempt to repristinate Paul’s theology of 
incongruous grace in a new context, so that it shaped not only the entry-point into the 
Christian life, but also the form and character of the believer’s continuing life of faith.  
The Pauline radicalism is here re-applied and sola gratia takes on additional 
meanings.  Where Paul had challenged the taken-for-granted value of Jewish practice 
(“the works of the law”) in the name of a radicalized version of the Jewish thematic of 
divine mercy or grace, the Reformers turned against the instrumentalization of 
Christian good works as means of procuring divine grace, and in the process opened 
the door to a long-lasting denigration of Judaism as a grace-less religion.   
 This is not to say that the extension, development, and enlargement of Pauline 
discourse is in principle an illegitimate procedure.  It is, in fact, an essential, and not 
just an inevitable, element of Christian hermeneutics.  What historical criticism can 
offer, however, is a tool by which that hermeneutical work can become self-conscious 
and self-critical, and an angle of approach which can open new possibilities for the 
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contemporary hermeneutical task.  In this case, given our own historical context in an 
increasingly post-Christian environment, it is possible to find new connections to 
Pauline theology that are less likely to encumber his theology with additional, and 
now perhaps problematic, perfections of grace.  As we saw, by stressing the 
incongruity of grace, Paul brought the normal definitions of worth into question, those 
prevalent both in his Jewish and in his non-Jewish social environment.  If God’s 
action in Christ is the sole source of symbolic capital, the regnant systems of worth 
lose their authority, and communities can be founded that can sit loose to, and even 
contradict, the goals and values of normal society.  It is that counter-cultural potential 
in Paul’s theology of grace, that capacity to look at social values askance from a new 
angle of vision, which could be reactivated and reapplied today.   
In this regard, Dahl was spot on.  At the conclusion to his essay on 
justification, he suggests that “the urgent task is … to rediscover the social relevance 
and implications of the doctrine of justification.”29  If we can disencumber Paul of 
some of the accretions to his theology of grace – some of the additional perfections 
that now might obscure rather than illuminate its original purpose – and if we can 
recover and restate its primary significance, both thoroughly Jewish and thoroughly 
distinctive, we might find ourselves in possession of a valuable tool for social 
critique.  If worth is not defined by racial identity or cultural heritage, if education is 
not an intrinsic but only an instrumental value, if wealth is to be measured only by its 
usefulness for others, if autonomy loses its Western status as a self-evident value and 
requires to be justified by a Christian evaluation of worth, one has the makings of a 
vision of reality radically reconceived by incongruous grace.   If, armed with this 
sceptical attitude to normal criteria of worth, the church can not only see the world 
differently, but also practise forms of community that disregard the hierarchies and 
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differentiations that govern society, we could find that grace brings not only balm to 
the soul but an impetus to social experimentation and social change parallel to the 
extraordinary experiments in social innovation which we call the earliest Christian 
churches.   
 
John M.G. Barclay 
Department of Theology and Religion, 
Durham University, 
Abbey House, Palace Green, 
Durham DH1 3RS 
UK 
john.barclay@durham.ac.uk
 21 
 
 
Bibliography 
Babcock W.S. “Augustine’s Interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396),” Augustinian  
 Studies 10 (1979) 55-74. 
Badiou, A. Saint Paul. La Fondation de l’Universalisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires  
 de France, 1997.  (Translated by R. Brassier as Saint Paul.  The Foundation of  
 Universalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.)   
Barclay, J.M.G. “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ.” In Redefining  
 First-Century Jewish and Christian Identities, edited by F.E. Udoh. Notre  
 Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.  
Barclay, J.M.G. “Faith and Self-Detachment from Cultural Norms: A Study of  
 Romans 14-15”, ZNW 104 (2013) 192-208. 
Barclay, J.M.G. Paul and the Gift.  Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming. 
Barth, K. Der Römerbrief. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1954 (reprint of 2
nd
 edition,  
 1922). 
Baur, F.C. The Church History of the First Three Centuries.  Edinburgh: Williams  
 and Norgate, 1875.  
Billings, J.T. Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union  
 with Christ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Bultmann, R. Theologie des neuen Testaments. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1948. 
Burke, K. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose. Berkeley: University of  
 California Press, 1954. 
Burke, K. Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. 
Campbell, D.A. The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in  
 22 
 Paul.  Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009. 
Dahl, N.A. “Rudolf Bultmann’s Theology of the New Testament.” In N.A. Dahl, The  
 Crucified Messiah and Other Essays. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1974; originally  
 published in German in 1954. 
Dahl, N.A. “The Doctrine of Justification: Its Social Function and Effects.” In N.A.  
 Dahl, Studies in Paul. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1977; originally published  
 in Norwegian in 1964.   
Dahl, N.A. “The Missionary Theology in the Epistle to the Romans.”  In N.A.  
 Dahl, Studies in Paul. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1977. 
Dahl, N.A. “The Neglected Factor in New Testament Theology.”  In Jesus the Christ.  
 The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine, edited by D.H. Juel.  
 Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991; originally published in 1975.   
Derrida, J. Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money (translated by P. Kamuf). Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Dunn, J.D.G. The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays.  Tübingen: Mohr  
 Siebeck, 2005. 
Gerrish, B.A. Grace and Gratitude. The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin.  
 Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993. 
Harrison, J.R. Paul’s Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context. Tübingen:  
 Mohr Siebeck, 2003. 
Holm, B.K. Gabe und Geben bei Luther: Das Verhältnis zwischen Reziprozität und  
 reformatorischer Rechtfertigungslehre. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006. 
Johnson Hodge, C.  If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the  
 Letters of Paul.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Käsemann, E. “Paulus und Israel.” In E. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und  
 23 
 Besinnungen.  Volume 2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965. 
Mannermaa, T. Two Kinds of Love.  Martin Luther’s Religious World (translated by  
 K. Stjerna); Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010. 
Martyn, J.L. Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary.  
 Anchor Bible 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997. 
Matlock, R.B. “The Rhetoric of pi/stij in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22  
 and Philippians 3.9,” JSNT 30 (2007) 173-203. 
Oberman, H.A. The Dawn of the Reformation.  Essays in Late Medieval and Early  
 Reformation Thought. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986. 
Patout Burns, J. The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace.  Paris:  
 Études Augustiniennes, 1980. 
Sanders, E.P. Paul and Palestinian Judaism. London: SCM Press, 1977. 
Sechrest, L. A Former Jew.  Paul and the Dialectics of Race. London: T & T Clark,  
 2009. 
Watson, F. Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective.  Second  
 revised edition; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007. 
Wetzel, J. “Snares of Truth: Augustine on free will and predestination.”  In Augustine  
 and his Critics. Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner, edited by R. Dodaro and  
 G. Lawless. London/New York: Routledge. 
 24 
 
                                                 
1
 Dahl, “Rudolf Bultmann’s Theology,” 90-128, 175-177. 
2
 Dahl, “Neglected Factor,” 153-163. 
3
 Dahl, “Doctrine of Justification,” 95-120. 
4
 Burke, Permanance and Change, 292-95; Language as Symbolic Action, 16-20. 
5
 See Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 1.6.1; 1.23.3; 5.5.6.  For discussion of Marcion’s perfections of 
grace, and those of others in the history of reception of Paul, see Barclay, Paul and the Gift, chapter 3. 
6
 See Patout Burns, Development of Augustine’s Doctrine. 
7
 The process of radicalization began in Augustine’s Ad Simplicianum (396 CE); see Babcock, 
“Augustine’s Interpretation of Romans,” 55-74. 
8
 See Wetzel, “Snares of Truth,” 124-41. 
9
 See Oberman, Dawn of the Reformation; Holm, Gabe und Geben bei Luther. 
10
 See, for instance, Luther’s Freedom of the Christian Man; for discussion, see Mannermaa, Two 
Kinds of Love.   
11
 See Billings, Calvin, Participation and the Gift; Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude.    
12
 This is especially the case in Barth’s Römerbrief.   
13
 Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace, 100-101, 266, 345-349. 
14
 Derrida, Given Time, 7-24.  
15
 Bultmann, Theologie des neuen Testaments, 259-260. 
16
 Käsemann, “Paulus und Israel,” 194-197. 
17
 Badiou, Saint Paul. 
18
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. 
19
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 297. 
20
 See Dunn, New Perspective.  For the connection with post-Enlightenment thematics (e.g., Baur, 
Church History, 1.72), see Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 40-47. 
21
 See, e.g., Philo, Deus 86-110; Leg 3.65-106; Migr 56-58; Ebr 94; Mut 52. 
22
 Dahl, “Doctrine of Justification,” 95-120; “Missionary Theology,” 70-87.   
23
 I remain unconvinced by the new reading of the ambiguous Greek phrase pistis Christou as “the 
faith/faithfulness of Christ” (as championed by Hays, Martyn, Campbell, and others).  In Gal 2.16 (its 
first occurrence in the Pauline correspondence) Paul removes the ambiguity by glossing it at once with 
the verb, “we have believed in Christ Jesus”.  See Matlock, “Rhetoric of pistis,” 173-203. 
24
 See Barclay, “Faith and Self-Detachment,” 192-208. 
25
 For recent, and very different, attempts to grapple with this issue, see Johnson Hodge, If Sons, Then 
Heirs and Sechrest, A Former Jew.   
26
 See Campbell, Deliverance of God. 
27
 See Barclay, “Grace and the Redefinition,” 372-389.  
28
 See, e.g., Martyn, Galatians, 263-275.   
29
 Dahl, “Doctrine of Justification,” 119. 
 
